Event command
assessment.
Twenty-five questions. Six minutes.
Twenty-five questions on the things that decide whether a bad night becomes a catastrophic one: command, show stop authority, plans, and the people you have never rehearsed with. Built for producers, promoters and venue operators.
Across the event failures that produced formal findings, the same three things were missing: a named person with authority to stop, conditions agreed in advance that would trigger stopping, and a single command structure that included the agencies who would have to respond. Answer as the operation actually runs, not as the plan describes it.
Other than the tab in the Emergency Procedures Guide … for Severe Thunderstorm Warnings, there was no plan or protocol in place that defined when to delay, postpone, or cancel a production at the Grandstand Stage for public safety reasons.
Witt Associates, independent assessment of the 2011 Indiana State Fair collapseThis scores an event operation: how it is planned, permitted, commanded and rehearsed. To score a protective programme instead, use the EP Program Assessment. To score an individual principal's exposure, use the Exposure Assessment.
Where the gaps are, and what closing them involves.
Your score and domain breakdown are above. The full profile adds the finding behind each weak domain, drawn from the formal investigations listed at the foot of this page, and the order we would work them.
We use this to send your profile and to understand who the instrument is reaching. We will not pass it to anyone else.
Where we would start
A consultation is a thirty minute call with a Shadow event risk lead. We walk your profile, tell you plainly what can be fixed before your next show and what needs a longer runway, and give you a scope and a timeline. No charge and no obligation.
Basis and sources
- Report from the Texas Task Force on Concert Safety, presented to the Governor of Texas, 19 April 2022. Five findings: unified on-site command and control, permitting, training, planning with risk assessment, and centralised resources. Source here for the designated production representative holding show stop authority on site throughout, the documented chain of command, show stop triggers outlined in permit applications and agreed by the unified command in advance, the identification of the EMS, fire and police agencies that would answer a 911 call from the site and their inclusion in that command group, the permitting and occupancy load findings, artist research and artist conduct as a contractual matter, perimeter risk at manufactured events, barricade geometry, social media monitoring during the event, and the preshow package of tabletop exercises, site walkthrough drills, briefings before and after shifts and a disseminated communication tree.
- Witt Associates, An Independent Assessment of the August 13, 2011 Indiana State Fair Collapse Incident, April 2012. Source of the findings on absent delay and cancellation protocols, absent weather thresholds and monitoring, and unclear public safety responsibility.
- Manchester Arena Inquiry, Volume 1 (Security, June 2021) and Volume 2 (Emergency Response, November 2022), chaired by Sir John Saunders. Source of the findings on inadequate event medical provision measured against the Purple Guide, the absent structured alert to the ambulance service, failures of joint working between emergency services, and the effect of one commander holding too many concurrent roles.
- FEMA IS-15, Special Events Contingency Planning, and the FEMA Incident Command System resources, under which a planned event is treated as an incident and unified command applies where more than one agency has jurisdiction.
- Event Safety Alliance, The Event Safety Guide, and ANSI ES1.9-2020, Event Safety, Crowd Management, on written major incident plans, occupant load for spaces without fixed seating, and every operational function head understanding the show stop procedure.
- UK Health and Safety Executive, Planning for incidents and emergencies, on identifying who can initiate a show stop, pre-agreed announcement wording, testing communications before the event, and command passing to the police on declaration of a major incident.
- Astroworld Festival, 5 November 2021. Two different classes of source are used here and are worth separating. The Texas Task Force report contains a state-level account of the event, and the statements that no permits were obtained, that the perimeter was breached hours before the performance by unticketed attendees, that no occupancy load was issued, that the county held permitting jurisdiction while the city answered 911 calls, and that the concert continued for roughly a further half hour after the mass casualty declaration are drawn from it. Separately, the detail of the event operations plan and of the command post arrangements comes from documentary reporting by the Houston Chronicle and Houston Public Media, not from any official finding. The Houston Police Department released an investigative offense report which contains no summary, conclusions or recommendations, and no multi-agency after-action review has been published.
This assessment is a structured self-assessment, not an audit, an inspection or a licensing review, and it does not constitute a safety assessment of any specific event, site or production. Nothing here is legal advice. Statutory duties on event organisers vary by jurisdiction and are changing, including under the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act 2025 in the United Kingdom, whose duties follow an implementation period of at least twenty four months from Royal Assent in April 2025 and so cannot commence before 2027.
Before the next show.
The assessment tells you which domains are short. A scoping call tells you what can be fixed before doors, and what needs a longer runway.